Constitutional Law -- Extra Territorial Effect Executive Agreements by Goldworm, William Jay
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
10-1-1955
Constitutional Law -- Extra Territorial Effect
Executive Agreements
William Jay Goldworm
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Jay Goldworm, Constitutional Law -- Extra Territorial Effect Executive Agreements, 10 U. Miami L. Rev. 109 (1955)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol10/iss1/13
CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXTRA TERRITORIAL EFFECT
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
Plaintiff, an American citizen, brought an action against the United
States for damage to property, situated in Austria, which had been
utilized as an officers' club by the United States Army after the cessation
of hostilities. The defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. Held, an
American citizen is entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment
when her property had been damaged or stolen; that such recovery was
not barred on grounds that the property was located in "enemy territory."
Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
The earliest view, best expressed in In re Ross,' had been that, in the
absence of a treaty, the Constitution had no authority outside the territorial
limits of the United States; and where a treaty was in effect, only to the
narrowest limitations of the treaty. This doctrine was somewhat vitiated
in an outstanding Insular case, Downes v. Bidwell;2 the court stating that
Congress had the power to extend any portion of the Constitution to a
territory in which the United States was sovereign. A strong dissent by
Chief Justice Fuller expressed the opinion that if Congress had the right
to extend the Constitution at all, it should extend the Constitution in
its entirety, as all of the powers of the legislature are derived from the
Constitution. In more recent cases, the courts have held that American
citizens in foreign jurisdictions are bound by American law,:' their first
loyalty being to the United States. 4  This theory has encompassed, by
implication,'the major portion of the constitutional rights;5 and in Turney
v. United States" the court expressly extended the Fifth Amendment. The
factor to be considered in extending and applying the doctrine is whether
or not the plaintiff has been acted upon by an instrumentality of the
United States.
Executive agreements, whether implemented by congressional action'
or not,8 have been held analogous to treaties within the meaning of
Article IV, Clause 2, of the Constitution, in that such an agreement may
withdraw the consent of the United States to be sued, since the right
to sue the United States is not a vested right.0  However, in the Pink
1. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
2. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
3. Steele v. Bnlova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
4. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 944 (1st Cir. 1949).
5. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (.C. Cir. 1951) (Fifth Amendment
in occupied territories only extended to citizens of the United States if it extended
at all); Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denid, 340 U.S.
939 (1951) (Fourth Amendment extended to an American citizen in Germany).
6. 115 F. Supp. 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
7. Hannevig v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 743 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
8. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation et al, 299 U.S. 304,
318 (1936); United States v. Behnont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942).
9. Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank of Phoenix, 318 U.S: 357, 362
(1943); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1933).
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case,"0 Justices Douglas" and Frankfurter r-' impliedly reserved the question
as to whether an executive agreement would be valid if it impaired the
constitutional rights of an American citizen.
In the instant case the United States Army took possession of the
plaintiff's property as an officers' club in 1945, and when the plaintiff
visited the property in 1948 she discovered it to be greatly damaged. The
plaintiff filed a claim with the Army asserting that her property had been
taken by the United States for public use and therefore she was entitled
to just compensation.'' The United States contended that although the
property belonged to an American citizen, it was "enemy territory"' 4 and
therefore subject to seizure.'5 1h plaintiff contended that Austria was
not enemy territory at the time of the taking, in July 1945, but was a
liberated country.u The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.
The trend of the decisions in this area of de facto sovereignty has
been to extend the operation of constitutional privileges and immunities.
However, the extent to which the provisions of the Constitution will be
applied to any given case apparently depends upon the special facts of
the case; no safe generalizations can be made. The relationship between
the claimant and the sovereignty which the United States may hold in
the particular area would be a significant factor. Perhaps the most
important of the considerations is the fact that the injury was the result
of an action by an instrumentality of the United States.
WILLIAM JAY GoLnwoR?,t
CRIMINAL LAW-INCEST-CONSENT
The defendant, half-brother of the prosecutrix, was convicted of first
degree rape and incest. He moved for an order arresting judgment and
setting aside the verdict on the grounds that the crimes of rape and incest
are mutually exclusive and cannot arise from the same act. Held, if the
parties are within the prescribed lines of consanguinity, proof of first
degree rape may result in a dual conviction of rape and incest. People v.
Wilson, 135 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1954).
The defendant's contention was that acts constituting rape must
necessarily be effectuated without the female's consent, while such consent
is an essential element of the crime of incest. Courts generally agree that
the crime of rape requires an absence of consent.1  But such accord is
10. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
11. Id. at 227.
12. Id. at 236.
13. Filbin Corp. v. United States, 266 Fed. 911 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Lajoie v. Milliken,
242 Mass. 508, 136 N. E. 419, 423 (1922).
14. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1879).
15. The Juragua Iron Co., Ltd. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909),
16. H. R. Doc. No. 351, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); 15 DEP'T STATE BULL.
384-864 (1946).
1. See 44 Am. JuR., Rape § 8 (1942).
